The yuan accounted for 20.8% of payments for Russian exports to countries Moscow calls "friendly" in June 2026, according to Bank of Russia data reported on 11 November 2026 by the Russian service of The Moscow Times, which drew on a Bloomberg analysis. The share peaked at 45.2% in May 2024. Roubles now cover 69.7% of those export receipts, against about 40% in the middle of 2024.1
The fall follows the widening of US secondary sanctions
The report dates the turn to June 2024, when the United States broadened the grounds on which it can penalise foreign banks and companies that deal with Russia. Such penalties are called secondary sanctions because they fall on third parties, here Chinese banks, and not on the sanctioned country itself. According to the report, payments were then frozen or delayed for months, transfers were returned, and the largest Chinese banks stopped working with Russian counterparties.1
Bloomberg's comparison of Chinese customs data with Bank of Russia data, as relayed in the same report, shows the effect on the flow of currency. In July 2024 Russia received $5.96 billion more in yuan for its exports than it paid out. By June 2026 that had become a deficit of $3.86 billion, which means Russia was earning little yuan even on its sales to China.1
The report says the higher rouble share does not show that the rouble is used more widely abroad. Rouble deals pass through intermediaries, payment agents and cryptocurrency, and documents from a Russian freight and customs firm, STT Logistics, put the cost to exporters at 15% to 20% of the value of a transaction. Another logistics group cited in the report, SibirTransAsia, says no method guarantees that a payment will arrive.1
Russian banks report more yuan payments, mostly for imports
Russian business sources describe a different part of the same picture: payments by importers for Chinese goods. The payment service A7, set up at the state-owned bank PSB, said the yuan made up 36% of its clients' international settlements in January to June 2026, up from 29% a year earlier, and that imports account for more than 90% of its clients' settlements with China. That is one service's client base, not a national figure, and it measures payments going out of Russia, not export receipts.2
In March the newspaper Izvestia reported that Russian banks were expanding direct payments to China. State-controlled VTB said its portfolio of contracts with Chinese partners grew 82% in 2025, and Sovcombank reported a rise of more than 30% in transfers to China. A consultant quoted there put commissions at 0.2% to 2%, far below the 15% to 20% cost cited for exporters.3
Сейчас появляется всё больше прямых отношений между банками.
More and more direct relationships between banks are appearing now.3
The speaker was Alexei Poroshin, head of the investment firm Pervaya Gruppa. The same article carried a caution from an economist at Plekhanov University, who said large Chinese state banks had become more careful because of the risk of US secondary sanctions and could take longer over checks, ask for more documents or refuse a payment. Izvestia said it had asked the Bank of Russia and the People's Bank of China for comment.3
Beijing counts payments that SWIFT does not see
SWIFT, the messaging network most banks use for cross-border payments, showed the yuan's share of global payments at 4.74% in July 2024 and 3.1% more recently, according to the Moscow Times report. It adds that the governor of the People's Bank of China, Pan Gongsheng, said in October that the share is 6% to 7% once China's own Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) and other bank channels are included. An analyst at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, Martin Chorzempa, is quoted as saying CIPS growth is too small to explain the decline on SWIFT.1
China's state media present CIPS as growing steadily. Xinhua, carrying an Economic Daily report, said the system had 1,853 participants at the end of August 2026, of which 211 were direct, and reached nearly 5,300 banking entities in 192 countries and regions. The report gave no figure for payments connected with Russia.4
跨境支付体系不只是单纯的资金清算通道,还是金融双向开放的底层基础设施、人民币国际化的重要支撑。
The cross-border payment system is not merely a channel for clearing funds; it is basic infrastructure for two-way financial opening and an important support for the internationalisation of the renminbi.4
The statement is from Lu Lei, a deputy governor of the People's Bank of China.4
What is not yet known
The Bank of Russia series cited ends in June 2026, so it does not show whether the yuan's share moved after the summer. Neither central bank has published a figure for how many Chinese banks currently accept payments from Russia, and the 15% to 20% cost estimate comes from company documents, not from an official survey. The next Bank of Russia data on the currency structure of trade settlements will show whether the rouble share has stayed near 70%.1 3