The Trump administration describes its trade policy as the replacement of an order it considers failed, not as a departure from it. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer wrote in August 2025 that the system built around the World Trade Organization was "untenable and unsustainable" and that a "new economic order" was "emerging in real time". In March 2026 his office opened Section 301 investigations into "excess capacity" in 16 economies, and the next day a separate Section 301 investigation of 60 economies over imports made with forced labour. Beijing calls the capacity cases "typical unilateralism".1 2 3 11
The administration's account
Secretary of State Marco Rubio set out the geopolitical premise in an interview published by the State Department in January 2025. He said a single superpower was the exception, not the rule.4
"It's not normal for the world to simply have a unipolar power. That was not – that was an anomaly."
He said the world had returned to "multi-great powers in different parts of the planet", naming China and "to some extent Russia".4
Greer applied that view to trade. In his New York Times essay, republished by his office on 7 August 2025, he argued that the post-war trade rounds had drifted into "something unrecognizable", that "the biggest winner has been China, with its state-owned enterprises and five-year plans", and that the US had come to rely on "our adversaries for critical supply chains". He wrote that "the rules of international trade cannot be a suicide pact" and said the new order had been "solidified at Turnberry", the Scottish resort where one of the administration's 2025 trade deals was struck. In this account tariffs are the instrument: "a tariff is a formidable stick."1
In an article published in the International Monetary Fund's magazine in June 2026, Greer described the goal as "a new international economic order" resting on balance, reciprocity, fairness and resilience, and pointed to "the strengthened Section 301 authority my office is currently using". He said the US trade deficit with China fell 32% in 2025.5
The legal tools
Two US laws carry most of this policy now that tariffs under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act have been ruled invalid, a change China's Tariff Commission noted in November 2026.10
- Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 lets the Trade Representative impose tariffs after finding a foreign practice unreasonable or discriminatory. On 11 March 2026 USTR opened investigations into "structural excess capacity" in China, the European Union, Japan, India, Mexico, Korea, Taiwan, Vietnam and eight other economies. Greer said the United States would no longer give up its industrial base to other countries, and that many trading partners produce more goods than they can consume at home.2
- Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 lets the President restrict imports that threaten national security. A proclamation of 14 January 2026 put a 25% duty on certain advanced computing chips, saying the US makes "only approximately 10 percent of the chips it requires" and is "heavily reliant on foreign supply chains". It told officials to negotiate with trading partners and report within 90 days.6
Beijing's answer
China's Commerce Ministry rejects both the method and the premise. Responding on 13 March 2026, its spokesperson said the investigation was "typical unilateralism" and denied that Washington could judge other countries' capacity.3
美方更无权通过301调查,对贸易伙伴是否存在"产能过剩"进行单方面认定,并采取单边限制措施。
Still less does the US have the right to decide unilaterally, through a 301 investigation, whether trading partners have "excess capacity" and to take unilateral restrictive measures.3
The ministry added that WTO panels had already found tariffs imposed after Section 301 investigations to break WTO rules.3
Critics: one member cannot remake the order
Some trade lawyers dispute Greer's history and his conclusion. Mona Paulsen, writing on the International Economic Law and Policy Blog on 12 August 2025, argued that the multilateral system grew over decades through many governments and was not founded at Bretton Woods as Greer suggested. She wrote that the WTO "cannot be made or unmade by the rule-breaking of one Member"; whether a new era begins depends on how other members "perceive, justify, rationalise, accept, and repeat" those breaches.7
Is the world multipolar at all?
Rubio's premise is itself contested. The political scientist Daniel Drezner argued in 2023 that "the world is bipolar now", with the US and China far ahead of everyone else, and that "true multipolarity might be a thing in a decade or so" if India keeps rising.8
Others say Washington errs in the opposite direction. Shirley Ze Yu, writing in Al Majalla in November 2025, argued that President Trump's talk of a US-China "G2" around his October 2025 meeting with Xi Jinping in Busan "does not represent a return to the bipolarity of the Cold War". She said the "G2" framing sidelined the WTO, the EU and other US partners, and that the real contest is "between competing visions of what comes after American unipolarity".9
The next legal milestone for the Section 301 route is the outcome of the excess-capacity investigations opened on 11 March 2026. No determination appears among the sources read for this article, and Beijing has said it will adjust its own countermeasures to whatever Washington decides.2 10