The European Union's leaders describe 2026 as a year of rivalry between great powers, and their answer has been to sign more trade agreements while preparing to defend the single market. The Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, told EU ambassadors on 9 March 2026 that the Union's network of agreements "currently includes almost 50% of global GDP", and thanked them for work "to deepen, derisk and diversify our partnerships around the world".1
The vocabulary: autonomy, de-risking, diversification
Three terms recur in Brussels and the capitals. "Open strategic autonomy", a formula long used in EU trade policy, means staying open to trade while cutting dependence on single suppliers of critical goods. Sinan Ülgen of Carnegie Europe, an independent think tank, wrote in June 2026 that "strategic autonomy, in this sense, is neither decoupling nor alignment", and that "the real task is selective de-risking".2
Von der Leyen herself said in March that labels such as "middle powers or multipolar disorder" hide more important facts, and pointed out that "almost two thirds of global growth is happening outside of the US and China".1
Germany, the EU's largest exporter, uses the same words. Before flying to Beijing on 24 February 2026, Chancellor Friedrich Merz said:3
Wir wollen und müssen eine Politik des „De-Risking" betreiben.
We want to, and must, pursue a policy of "de-risking".3
He added that this applies not only to China and must not lead to decoupling, and he called China a country that "has risen into the ranks of the great powers". In Singapore on 27 October he repeated that decoupling "would be a big mistake" and said Germany was pursuing "de-risking and diversification", with a bloc-to-bloc agreement between the EU and the Southeast Asian ASEAN group "the best way to move forward".3 4
The trade agreements
The Commission presents its agreements as the main tool of diversification. Von der Leyen listed them in March: "We started with Mexico, Switzerland and Indonesia. Then Mercosur, after 25 years of failed attempts, and India".1
- Mercosur: the agreement with Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay was signed against the wishes of France and Poland, and von der Leyen announced in February 2026 that it would be applied provisionally before the EU Court of Justice gives its opinion. She said "Europa wird stärker und unabhängiger", Europe is becoming stronger and more independent.5
- India: talks concluded in January 2026. The Commission says the deal would eliminate or reduce 90% of tariffs and save European exporters about €4 billion a year in duties, and it describes the aim as strengthening "the EU's economic security by diversifying supply". In September it sent the texts to the Council; signature, the European Parliament's consent and India's ratification are still to come.6
The defences
The anti-coercion instrument is an EU regulation that lets Brussels answer economic pressure from another country with tariffs, export limits or exclusion from public tenders. It has never been used. When President Trump threatened in May 2026 to raise US tariffs on European cars to 25%, France's president, Emmanuel Macron, said the EU should use its instruments, since that is their purpose, and that "agreements that have been signed must be respected". Von der Leyen answered that "a deal is a deal" and that the Commission was ready for all scenarios.7
The European Parliament had given the law carrying out the 2025 tariff deal with Washington only conditional approval at that point, with a final version still to be negotiated with member states, and the instrument has still not been used. Ülgen's study finds the EU's exposure concentrated in a narrow set of inputs such as energy, electronics and critical minerals. In his account energy dependence lies mostly on the United States, minerals exposure reflects a broader reliance on outside suppliers, and China is named as the main risk for technology.2 7
Beijing's reply
China's Commerce Ministry has said it will resist. Asked on 29 September 2026 about reports that some member states were drafting a paper urging the Commission to create a European version of Section 301, the US law that lets Washington impose tariffs against foreign practices it judges unfair, a ministry spokesperson said:8
报道所提工具,是典型的保护主义、单边主义措施,不仅无助于解决问题,还会反噬自身。
The tool mentioned in the reports is a typical protectionist and unilateral measure that will not only fail to solve problems but will also backfire.8
The spokesperson added that the EU "was once a victim of such tools" and warned that if Brussels introduced discriminatory measures against Chinese firms, China "will certainly respond firmly".8
Berlin and Brussels describe de-risking as prudence that leaves trade open; Beijing describes the instruments built in its name as protectionism. Both readings now shape EU trade law. The next dated step on the US side is the end of December 2026, when the EU may suspend its tariff concessions if US duties on some steel- and aluminium-containing goods, now up to 50%, have not been brought into line with the 15% ceiling of the deal; on the Asian side, the Indonesia agreement is due to be signed in Brussels on 21 November.9 10