The dollar's share of the world's official currency reserves fell to 56.70% in the second quarter of 2026, from 57.18% three months earlier, and the Chinese renminbi's share rose to 2.11%, the International Monetary Fund reported on 30 September 2026. Whether such changes mark a lasting shift away from the dollar in trade is disputed: China's central bank says the dominance of a single currency is "gradually changing", while US Federal Reserve staff find the dollar's international use "little changed".1 2 3
The case that dollar dominance is eroding
The governor of the People's Bank of China, Pan Gongsheng, set out Beijing's view at the Lujiazui Forum in Shanghai on 18 June 2025:2
单一主权货币主导跨境支付的局面正逐步改变。
The situation in which a single sovereign currency dominates cross-border payments is gradually changing.2
He said the system may evolve towards "a few sovereign currencies coexisting, competing and checking each other", and that the renminbi is already the second-largest currency for trade finance and, by his full-coverage count, the third-largest for payments.2
China points to its own payment infrastructure. Its Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS), a renminbi clearing network that works alongside SWIFT, had 1,853 participants at the end of August 2026, 211 of them direct, Xinhua reported on 28 September.4
A second project, mBridge, links central bank digital currencies for cross-border payments. Mu Changchun, head of the central bank's digital currency institute, said at the Summer Davos forum on 24 June 2026 that the platform's cumulative transactions came to the equivalent of nearly 500 billion yuan by the end of 2025, with 49 commercial banks taking part.5
截至2025年底,平台累计交易额折合近5000亿元人民币。
By the end of 2025, the platform's cumulative transaction value was equivalent to nearly 500 billion yuan.5
The BRICS group has also endorsed the idea, cautiously. Its New Delhi Declaration of September 2026 only acknowledges discussions on settling trade and investment in members' local currencies, "recognising that no single solution fits all".6
The case that the data show little change
The broad measures still put the dollar far ahead. The Bank for International Settlements found in its three-yearly survey that the dollar was on one side of 89% of all foreign-exchange trades in April 2025, against 28.9% for the euro; daily turnover reached $9.6 trillion.7
Federal Reserve staff concluded in July 2025 that "the dollar's international usage is little changed over the past 5 years". Their index of international currency use has kept the dollar between about 65 and 70 since 2010, against about 24 for the euro and about 3 for the renminbi, and they judged that the dollar "will likely remain the world's dominant international currency for the foreseeable future". The note says its data come with a lag and cannot yet show the effects of the 2025 tariffs.3
SWIFT, the bank messaging network, is the most-quoted source on payments, and reports of its figures vary. A payments trade site reported in June 2026 that SWIFT's tracker put the dollar at 59.10% of global payments by value and the renminbi sixth at 2.18%, and in trade finance the dollar at 82.50% and the renminbi at 5.51%. The Moscow Times, citing the same network in November 2026 without giving a month, put the renminbi fifth with 3.1%. SWIFT publishes more than one measure, and this site could not open SWIFT's own file to reconcile the two.8 9
The IMF itself notes that its reserve figures move with prices and portfolio choices: in the second quarter, exchange rates moved within about 2%, so the shifts were mainly due to "other price changes and/or portfolio reallocations".1
Where local-currency trade has grown, and where it has not
The clearest test is Russia, cut off from much of the dollar system by sanctions. Bank of Russia data reported by The Moscow Times on 11 November 2026 show the yuan's share of payments for Russian exports to "friendly" countries falling to 20.8% in June 2026 from 45.2% in May 2024. Roubles now cover 69.7% of Russia's export receipts overall.9
Усилия России по переходу на юани в международных расчетах пошли прахом.
Russia's efforts to switch to yuan in international settlements have come to nothing.9
The same report quotes Mr Pan as saying in October that the renminbi's share of international settlements is 6% to 7% once CIPS and other bank channels are counted, a figure China gives and SWIFT does not capture.9
Saudi Arabia has left mBridge. The trade publication Ledger Insights, relaying the Financial Times, reported on 21 September 2026 that the Saudi central bank said its exit had been planned once a trial was complete; it had processed no public transactions. The platform is now run by China, Hong Kong, Thailand and the UAE, with Macau going live this year.10
What to watch
The two camps measure different things. Beijing counts payment channels it runs and reports growth in them; the IMF, the BIS and the Fed measure shares of world totals, where the dollar's lead remains wide. The latest IMF figures read for this article cover only the second quarter of 2026, so the open question is whether the second-quarter dip in the dollar's reserve share continues.1 3 4